The place of philosophy of law between justice and efficiency by Lipovetsky e Silva, Nathália
 
 
 
25th IVR World Congress 
 
LAW SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Frankfurt am Main 
 
15–20 August 2011 
 
Paper Series 
No. 082 / 2012 
Series B 
Human Rights, Democracy; Internet / intellectual property, Globalization 
Series D 
History of Philosophy; Hart, Kelsen, Radbruch, Habermas, Rawls; Luhmann; General 
Theory of Norms, Positivism 
 
Nathália Lipovetsky e Silva 
The Place of Philosophy of Law 
between Justice and Efficiency 
 
 
 URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-249408 
 
This paper series has been produced using texts submitted by authors until April 2012. 
No responsibility is assumed for the content of abstracts. 
 
 
Conference Organizers: 
Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. Ulfrid Neumann, 
Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main 
Professor Dr. Klaus Günther, Goethe 
University, Frankfurt/Main; Speaker of 
the Cluster of Excellence “The Formation 
of Normative Orders” 
Professor Dr. Lorenz Schulz M.A., Goethe  
University, Frankfurt/Main 
Edited by: 
Goethe University Frankfurt am Main 
Department of Law 
Grüneburgplatz 1 
60629 Frankfurt am Main 
Tel.: [+49] (0)69 - 798 34341 
Fax: [+49] (0)69 - 798 34523 
 
 
 
 1 
Nathália Lipovetsky e Silva, Belo Horizonte / Brazil
 
 
The Place of Philosophy of Law between Justice and Efficiency 
 
Abstract:  A  discussion  regarding  the  complex  relationship  that  exists  between  the  concepts  of 
efficiency and justice goes a long way back and raises several relevant arguments. One of them, and it 
must be rejected in advance, is that justice is in the realm of public law, while efficiency in that of 
private law. Is it unacceptable that the balance between public and private law leads to the belief of a 
divided  legal  system;  one  system,  one  set  of  laws,  one  legal  system.  Legislators  and  judges  are 
responsible for determining a balance and no theory can postulate that the balance will always be 
found with a simple cut between public and private law to distinguish when the criterion should be 
justice or when it should be efficiency. It is reductionist to confine the discussion to single goals of 
efficiency and justice, when human dignity and human rights should also be considered when one is 
discussing law. Moreover, a discussion limited to only the concepts of justice and efficiency, relies on 
a belief that the terms are mutually exclusive. Posner has said that the economic analysis of law has 
limits  and philosophy of  law  plays  an  extremely important role in this  discourse,  which  must  be 
interdisciplinary. There can be no goal other than the realization of human rights and there can be no 
justice if not shared by all of mankind. 
Keywords: Justice, Efficiency, Human Rights 
 
I. Introduction 
This paper aims to briefly discuss the relation between justice and efficiency and the role of 
philosophy of law in this relation. There are several arguments that could be brought up to the 
discussion and we set the bounds of this paper on the goals of law and the possibility of 
justice and efficiency coexisting in harmony. Before outlining our conclusions, we are going 
to discuss the notorious dichotomy that exists between private law and public law. 
To set the tone of the work, we start by making the most important conceptualization to 
the development of the paper: an attempt to define justice and efficiency. The difficulty of the 
task is quite obvious, especially when talking about conceptualizing justice. For this reason 
the Classical Antiquity’s concept of justice will be used as the basis for the discussion and to 
emerge with a contemporary understanding of justice capable of fulfilling the goals of law 
and of the State, as a maximum ethicum. 
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II. Starter concepts 
1.  Justice  
Justice in Classical Antiquity is an areté, a capacity, an excellence, a virtue, whose place is in 
the soul. The areté for justice is, in ancient Greek, a dikaiosýne. The notion of “justice” in the 
archaic age had already been originally set, under the meaning of the word díke. In the scope 
of the archaic thought, díke was one of the former notions towards the change from pre-State 
juridical form to the political ground and, later, to ontological and cosmological grounds. This 
concept of díke, and the posterior ethical-juridical concept that was absorbed by the western 
tradition, are the ones that relate to our contemporary experiences.
1  
In Plato’s work justice plays a central role, as the virtue that agrees to everyone, as a 
good  in  itself,  as  something  desirable  in  itself.  Speaking  through  Socrates  mouth,  Plato 
defines justice as “the duty imposed to each one to do not play more than a role in society but 
the  one  to  which  nature  gave  him  more  capability”.  Hence,  justice  to  Plato  is  harmony: 
between the warring parts of the person (reason, spirit and desire) and of the city (temperance 
of the merchants, courage of the soldiers and wisdom of the governors – the philosophers). 
Justice aims unit in the multiplicity.
2 
To Aristotle, justice “is the most perfect virtue and contains all the other virtues within 
it”. One cannot forget that the idea of virtue to Aristotle is exactly the balance and moderation 
between a deficiency and an excess of a behavior. Justice is the balance in itself; it either is or 
is not. He distinguishes two particular types of justice in his Nicomachean Ethics: distributive 
and commutative justice. 
 
“One type of justice, and of what is just in that same sense, is that found in distributions of honour or 
money or the other things that have to be shared among members of the political community (since here 
one person can have a share equal or unequal to another’s). 
Another type is that which plays a rectificatory role in transactions. This type divides into two, since some 
transactions are voluntary, others involuntary. The voluntary transactions are things like selling, buying, 
lending without interest, depositing, and letting (they are called voluntary because the first principle in 
these transactions is voluntary). The involuntary ones are either secret – such as theft, adultery, poisoning, 
procuring, enticing away slaves, treacherous murder, and false witness – or involve force, such as assault, 
imprisonment, murder, robbery, maiming, slander, and insult.”
3  
 
The concept of justice as equality comes from the thought of Aristotle and it is the oldest and 
most traditional of the concepts of justice. It postulates equality as the goal of law both in the 
relations  between  individuals  and  individuals  (commutative  justice)  and  in  the  relations 
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between  individuals  and  State  (distributive  justice).  According  to  this  theory,  the  order 
brought in by law has to respect equality to be fair and to achieve justice.
4  
On the discussion between justice and efficiency, distributive justice is more frequently 
the type of justice in question, specifically referring to the just distribution of income, which 
is an issue currently plaguing humanity. However, according to Mathis, it is important to 
examine how both commutative and distributive justice relate to efficiency, as the efficiency 
criterion for economic analysis of law is applied primarily to non -contractual liability law, 
contract law and criminal law.
5  
 
2. Efficiency 
The usual definition of efficiency puts it as a synonym of productivity, or the performance of 
the economy, which, in a comparative figure over time, is the rate of economic growth. In 
Polinsky’s words: “efficiency corresponds to the ‘size of the pie’, while equity has to do with 
how it is sliced”.
6 
The most used concepts of efficiency are the Pareto Efficiency and the Kaldor-Hicks 
Criterion. The concept of efficiency developed by Vilfredo Pareto is based on three main 
principles: (1) consumer sovereignty – respect for the autonomous preferences of individuals, 
once there are no good or bad preferences; (2) non-paternalism – the utility of individuals is 
what matters to society and no additional considerations are ends in themselves required by 
the State; (3) unanimity – changes of allocation require the consent of all. The Pareto superior 
means that “any change that puts one member of society in a better position without making 
somebody else worse off is a Pareto improvement” and “a change that violates the Pareto 
criterion is termed Pareto inferior”. Also, Pareto optimum is the state in which a person’s 
position cannot be improved any further without making another person worse off, which 
means Pareto superior changes are no longer possible.
7  
The Pareto Superiority Principle appears to be morally uncontroversial because of an 
apparently simple finding: if we move from a Pareto Inferior to a Pareto Superior state, how 
could anyone complain about it? But the Paretian principles are morally uncontroversial only 
if they are treated as principles for  prima facie evaluation of social states, subject to the 
possibility of countervailing moral evaluations. Still, the decision of how much weight is to be 
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given to each particular social arrangement, satisfying or not the efficiency criterion, is not a 
morally neutral decision.
8  
The Pareto Efficiency does not apply to law and the coerciveness within law because it is 
based on the assumption of the free market model, in which every participant is free to choose 
whether or not to engage in market transactions. That is why Nicholas Kaldor and John R. 
Hicks, considering that legal decisions often have to be taken by weighing up competing 
interests, proposed a collective decision -making rule to be applied to non -Pareto-superior 
decisions, called the Kaldor-Hicks Criterion. So, “a change is an improvement by the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion if the gainers value their gains more highly than the losers their losses” and 
“every  new  allocation  of  property  rights  is  acceptable  as  long  as  the  gainers’  benefits 
outweigh the losers’ disadvantages”.
9  
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion “is not confined to options which leave nobody worse off, but 
also permits those which make some people better off at other people’s expense. If someone 
demands actual compensation, what this means is that the Pareto principle must in fact be 
satisfied.  So  the  Kaldor-Hicks  test  does  not  indicate  actual  Pareto  improvements,  only 
potential Pareto improvements.”
10  
 
III. The dichotomy private law x public law  
The classic dichotomy between private law and public law appears to be very inconsistent, as 
a result of the limitations private law might find in public law when the collective or public 
interest is set above private interest. 
 
“The public/private law dichotomy is a formalistic distinction which belies the fact that there are overlaps 
in private and public law and that all law is in fact guided by considerations of public policy. It evidences a 
philosophy which has been criticized for good reasons.  However, it is not inappropriate or contradictory to 
acknowledge the importance of public policy considerations which attach to the relationship between a 
statutory authority and an individual as opposed to an individual and another individual. (…)  However, the 
benefits of acknowledging that the dichotomy is fictional and that focusing on the relationship between the 
parties  at  the  duty  and  standard  stage  will  allow  for  the  incorporation  of  relevant  public  policy 
considerations applicable to the special relationship between the state and individual must be recognized.  
They will lead to an approach unfettered by vapid theories which will misdirect the development of the 
law.”
11 
 
Posner, however, proposed that the efficiency principle should be the guidance of the civil 
courts and that the public sector should be in charge of distributive justice. “Private law would 
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have to prioritize the efficiency criterion, and public law would have to prioritize the principle 
of justice.”
12 
 
“The judge whose business is enforcing tort, contract, and property law lacks effective tools for bringing 
about an equitable distribution of wealth, even if he thinks he knows what such a distribution would be. He 
would be further handicapped in such an endeavor by the absence of consensus in our society on the nature 
of a just distribution, an absence that undermines the social acceptability of attempts to use the judicial 
office to achieve distributive goals. A sensible division of labor has the judge making rules and deciding 
cases in the areas regulated by the common law in such a way as to maximize the size of the social pie, and 
the legislature attending to the sizes of the slices.”
13  
 
Mathis agrees that social policy goals can be more effectively fulfilled with a tax and transfer 
system rather than through private law, although he also affirms that the idea of dividing the 
sectors in order to achieve goals of justice and efficiency separately remains unconvincing 
because: 
 
“(1)  Allocation and distribution are indivisibly linked to one another. It is not possible to have efficient 
production on the one hand and just distribution on the other.  Taxes and transfers also have an 
influence on work incentives and the use of production factors. Hence, redistribution via the state 
administrative  apparatus  is  not  necessarily  always  more  efficient  than  redistribution  through 
regulation of the private sector. 
(2)   On the contrary, it is more than likely that low-cost and effective redistribution can be carried out 
equally well, specifically by means of private law. As the example of rent law shows, redistribution 
by fine-tuning legislation under private law can indeed work well. In principle, there is absolutely no 
reason not to use private law – as a complement to tax law and social law – as an instrument of 
redistribution in certain cases. 
(3)   In specific instances it could lead to very absurd outcomes if private law were focused solely on 
efficiency. Particularly in civil litigation, the parties are intent upon a ruling which is in tune with 
their conceptions of justice. They are unlikely to be satisfied with the reasoning that, although the 
ruling is not just, it encourages economic efficiency instead.”
14 
 
It is important to remind, here, that economics ethics is usually divided into three areas of 
concern: the division of output – deals with questions of distributive justice; the question of 
commodification – pertains to the property of using market rules in noneconomic matters, 
such as permitting a market for human organs; and the ethical basis of economic thought and 
analysis – relates to the anthropological premises of economic modeling and their impact in 
changing actual economic behavior.
15  
In this scenario, the question is how is it possible to try to place such discussion, for 
example, as a private or a public law matter of concern exclusively? These are ethical issues 
discussed with practical purposes, with questions that are being asked in courts and in the 
public sector on a daily basis. The whole legal system is involved in dealing regularly with 
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those issues and in finding a way to achieve justice, what will only happen with the aid of 
efficiency, due to the way a system works: interconnected and as an organized whole. 
Most importantly, it cannot be forgotten that the legal system is an unity and its divisions 
might be made with didactic or gnoseological purposes. This, however, does not alter the 
conclusion that there is only one legal system, with one single goal, for which efficiency 
represents a component.  
 
IV. The goals of law 
Norberto Bobbio, analyzing the history of the western thought, comes out with a synthesis of 
three answers to what would be the goals of law:  
(1) Justice as order – with the goal of law being social peace: the legal system is created 
so men can leave nature’s state of anarchy and war and establish social peace, in the name of 
the right to life; (2) Justice as equality – it comes from the thought of Aristotle and, as said 
above, puts equality as the goal of law both in the individual-individual and State-individual 
relations, and the legal system has to be based on the respect to equality to be fair; (3) Justice 
as liberty – it says that men reunite in society and constitute the State so they can guarantee 
the maximum expression of their personalities, of their individual liberties, which can only be 
possible under a legal system that assures to each individual a sphere of liberty that cannot be 
violated by others.
16 
The notion that men are free and cannot be considered means, but always and end in 
itself, prepares the construction of a new conception of social justice, having human dignity as 
a start and always bearing in mind the merit of being a person each one has.
17  
According to Salgado, law is the vector of western’s intelligibility and, hence, the point 
of arrival of western’s culture – a maximum ethicum
18. His idea of justice in the contemporary 
world 
 
“is understood as the historical processuality of law’s intelligibility, the result of the accumulation of this 
processuality in the historical present of our time, and expresses itself through the effectiveness of law in 
the just social order with universal signification, meaning that it effects the legitimacy of power by the 
democratic  procedurality,  whilst  this  power  has  its  origins  in  popular  will  and  organizes  itself  in  the 
separation  of  powers,  aiming  its  core  (the  declaration  of  rights)  and  axiological  content,  as  a  process 
historically  revealed,  constituted  of  the  culture’s  fundamental  values,  consciously  formalized  in  the 
declaration of fundamental rights, in the constitution, to its full effectiveness.”
19 
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According to  this  concept,  a society  is  considered just, meaning justice exists  within the 
society, when all factors are taken into account, with a consideration for the society on a 
universal  scope;  examining  the  international  relations  of  the  society  in  question.  If  the 
societies of Germany, France, Italy, USA etc. are considered as immersed in the totality of 
humanity (meaning as partners with places like Namibia, Congo or Brazilian slums/favelas) 
one cannot say they are just societies.
20 
The goal of law, thereby, is justice, to provide justice to the society, allowing every and 
each one, by the merit of being a person  –  a  dignified  human  being  –  to  have  one’s 
fundamental rights implemented. In other words, the goal of law is to assure fundamental 
rights to every human being, not only the ones under a certain legal system, but to all of them. 
Law does not have to be restricted to the specific legal system of a State, it has to be viewed 
and accomplished as a human institution created to make human life better. 
 
V. Is it possible for justice and efficiency to coexist? 
According to Mathis, justice and efficiency are two different goals and their relation can stand 
in three possible bases:  
(1) Harmony, in which the pursuit of one goal would be beneficial for the other goal; (2) 
Neutrality, in which the pursuit of one goal has no effect on the achievement of the other; (3) 
Conflict, in which justice and efficiency are considered replaceable up to a certain point and 
the interchangeability relation is named trade-off.
21 
This third position is the most common between economists and the trade-off could be on 
the production level or on the values level: “The values trade-off expresses how much justice 
a person or a society is prepared to sacrifice in order to achieve more efficiency (or vice 
versa). With a production trade-off, on the other hand, the question is: how much justice must 
be sacrificed in order to achieve a certain level of efficiency (or vice versa). And whereas the 
values trade-off is dependent upon individual values, the production trade-off is determined 
by empirical facts.”
22  
Under distributive justice, inequality is possible if the same standard runs all distribution. 
In this regards, Perelman presents six different distribution criteria
23:  
(1) To all in equal measure  – meaning all people should be treated the same way, with 
equality of income or opportunities; (2) To all according to their convictions – focusing on 
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people’s inner attitudes and values; (3) To all according to their rank – in an aristocratic way 
of  treating  people  according  to  their  social  status;  (4)  To  all  according  to  their  legal 
entitlement – respecting what the law says to be the rightful due to render to each one (justice 
in the Roman suum cuique); (5) To all according to their needs – distribution based on the 
needs of each one, in an attempt to define a minimum substance income for people; (6) To all 
according to their merit – creating incentives for certain forms of work, depending on the 
circumstances. 
These distribution criteria are based on a static concept of distributive justice, while most 
of  the  contemporary  theories  of  distributive  justice  are  dynamic,  meaning  they  postulate 
neither  a  specific  just  distribution  nor  an  ideal  distribution,  but,  instead,  they  “advocate 
institutional structures which enable individuals to do certain things or to realize life plans 
regardless of the exact result of the ultimate income distribution”.
24 
To Lalaguna, sometimes social wealth combines with justice, according to the economic 
analysis of law, in a way that little sacrifices on each side could bring benefits to both. But it 
requires  a  political  decision-making  process  that  would  choose  between  personal  and 
collective interests. If wealth does not have priority, it has to be placed as an element to be 
valued in conjunction with the others, as a component of value. That would be the case of 
lining up the difference between means and ends, in which wealth would be only a means to 
the achievement of an end, that would be justice in the measure that as wealth, inevitably, 
favors respect to the individuals of a society, it would favor justice as well.
25 
Continuing the discussion about the relation between means and ends in the economic 
analysis of law, Lalaguna says: 
 
“The economic analysis of law proposes an economic  interpretation of goods and responsibility. This 
means that economic benefit, its maintenance and its progress set the value that gives life to the whole 
institution.  Under  this  perspective,  the  rising  of  wealth  is  automatically  a  value,  since  it  provides  an 
increase of benefits and hence an improvement in economic compensations. It presumes that wealth is 
understood as a component of value by excellence, that has a value in itself – in the measure that it satisfies 
the exigencies of the homo economicus – and, thus, the capability of promoting other values – that could 
result as consequence of the acting of the ‘invisible hand’ –. 
The delimitation, in the sense, of wealth in the economic analysis of law is not clearly presented. From this 
one can say that not always wealth is a synonym of justice. (…) 
It is confirmed once again that the economic benefit is only one part of social and personal welfare; thus, 
the reductionism proposed by the economic analysis of law, far from reflecting reality, misrepresents it, 
losing its true sense by forgetting the existing relation between means and ends.”
26  
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To Dworkin the economic analysis of law has a descriptive and a normative limb, which is 
discussed in his work A matter of principle, affirming that the flaws of the normative limb are 
so huge that they throw doubts on its descriptive intentions. To the author, there is a bad 
comprehension  of  what  is  wealth  maximization  and  he  does  not  identify  it  with  Pareto 
Efficiency.
27  
 
“It is unclear why social wealth is a worthy goal. Who would think that a society that has more wealth (…) 
is either better off than a society that has less, except someone who made the mistake of personifying 
society, and therefore thought that a society is better off with more wealth in just the way any individual is. 
Why  should  anyone  who  has  not  made  this  mistake  think  that  social  wealth  maximizing  is  a  worthy 
goal?”
28  
 
According to Lalaguna, it is wrong and reductionist to want efficiency to have a protagonist 
role in the legal system, grounding society under the “protection” of wealth assumed as the 
goal of juridical norms. Both justice and efficiency affect the wealth distribution and one 
cannot forget that respecting the principle of equality is not necessarily actualizing justice, a 
reason why it is important and necessary that efficiency is comprehended as a component of 
justice.
29 Justice and efficiency not only can coexist, as they do and have to, precisely because 
efficiency is a key component of justice. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Posner did abandon his initial position that wealth, and, therefore, efficiency, was a social 
goal in itself. Efficiency is, thus, only an instrument to achieve other social goals. Criticizing 
wealth maximization does  not  necessarily mean that efficiency has no  justification, since 
justice and efficiency are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they have a complex and 
intrinsic relation. Even though justice sublates efficiency, inefficiency can cause a decrease in 
resource production, which results in affecting the effectuation of justice: economic growth 
generates resources to the public purse through taxes, which shall be converted in a better 
performance of State’s functions: promoting education, health care, social security etc. Social 
justice needs economic growth to be assured by the State. On the other hand, if injustice 
affects negatively the will to work and the productivity of people, it means efficiency also 
depends on justice.
30 
The relation between justice and efficiency is an issue that needs  to be seen through the 
perspective of the philosophy of law and not only through that of economics. The role of the 
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philosophy  of  law  is  exactly  not  to  allow  the  thought  that  efficiency  and  wealth,  typical 
concepts  of  economics,  to  seductively  overlap  the  goal  of  law:  justice.  Economics  can 
profitably be applied to law, but not in a way that wealth maximization overwhelms justice, 
because productivity is a goal of economics, but the goal of law is justice and that cannot be 
compromised. When law implements justice, efficiency is accomplished as well, sublated by 
justice and effectuated within it, as one of its many necessary elements. 
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